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THE
ABSTRACT
An extensive global system of private food regulation is under construction, one that exceeds conventional regulation thought
of as being driven by public authorities like FDA and USDA in the U.S. or the Food Standards Agency in the UK. Agrifood
and grocer organizations, in concert with some farming groups, have been the primary designers of this new food regulatory
regime. These groups have established alliances that compete with national regulators in complex ways. This article analyzes
the relationship between public and private sources of food safety regulation by examining standards adopted by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, a food safety organization jointly run by the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World
Health Organization and GlobalG.A.P., a farm assurance program created in the late 1990s by supermarket chains and their
major suppliers which has now expanded into a global certifying coalition. While Codex standards are adopted, often as
written, by national food safety regulators who are principal drivers of the standard setting process, customers for agricultural
products in many countries now demand evidence of GlobalG.A.P. certification as a prerequisite for doing business
This article tests not only the durability and strength of private sector standard setting in the food safety system, but also the
desirability of that system as an alternative to formal, governmental processes embodied, for our purposes, in the standards
adopted by Codex. In many cases, official standards and GlobalG.A.P. standards clash in ways that implicate not only food
safety but the flow of agricultural products in the global trading system. The article analyzes current weaknesses in both
regimes and possibilities for change that will better reconcile the two competing systems.
*263  INTRODUCTION
The safety and quality of a nation's food supply are the responsibilities of both its public, accountable officials and profit-
driven private actors. 1  Breakdowns in the management of these responsibilities have led to occurrences of food-borne
disease and death. A 2015 World Health Organization (WHO) report found that an estimated 600 million-almost 1 in 10
people in the world-fall ill after eating contaminated food and 420,000 die every year, resulting in the loss of 33 million
healthy life years, both in developed and developing countries. 2  The United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) estimates that 48 million illnesses, 128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths result from foodborne
diseases each year in the United States. 3  In 2015 alone, contaminated cilantro, cucumbers, onions, pork, tomatoes, tuna,
and turkey, as well as hygiene breakdowns at factories and restaurants resulted in hundreds of hospitalizations. 4  These
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outbreaks have prompted not only reform of public laws governing food safety, but also the construction of an extensive
global system of private regulation. 5  This new system of private food safety law is being developed by transnational
agrifood and grocer organizations, in concert with a small but growing number of farming group. 6  These groups have
established mutually interested alliances that cooperate and compete with national regulators in complex and shifting
ways. They have developed a shadow regulatory regime that often imposes verification burdens that exceed national or
international food safety requirements. 7
The complex relationship between public, formal food safety regulation-still implemented largely through public officials-
and private regulation implemented primarily through third-party auditors has raised critical questions about not only
who may appropriately make decisions with respect to food safety policy, but also how private regulation of food safety
may burden access to food as commerce and trade expand the reach and complexity of food supply chains.
The overall system of food regulation has therefore become a multi-centered private/public one, which operates in a
loosely coordinated and sometimes disjointed manner. Conceptually, this system articulates and adapts guiding norms
through channels of shared authority characteristic of “governance” systems; it also involves *264  multiple institutions
operating according to common principles, rules, procedures and programs typical of “regimes.” 8  In order to highlight
the principles and rules governing these processes and their interaction, this article evaluates the system as one of
regulation, and indeed of regulatory law-making driven by two sets of actors, one public and formal the other private
and less predictably organized.
The public actor is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), a food safety organization jointly run by the United
Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and WHO. The standards it issues are often adopted as written
by national governments, as they are the drivers of the standard setting process. 9  The private actor is GlobalG.A.P.,
a farm/producer assurance program created in the late 1990s by several European supermarket chains and their major
suppliers, which has now expanded into a global certifying coalition. G.A.P. is an acronym for Good Agricultural
Practices. Business customers for agricultural products--although not consumers--in many countries now demand
evidence of GlobalG.A.P. certification as a prerequisite for doing business. 10
For the past decade, a major institutional focus of this emergent system has been “certification,” wherein auditors certify
to specific constituencies-- e.g., consumers, other businesses, or regulators--that specific operations meet applicable
standards for food safety (or' animal welfare or worker rights) practices. 11  Because private certification is more
fragmented and decentralized than most government regulation, understanding it requires forsaking simplistic source-
of-law models for understanding how fundamental private-sector standard setting is changing norms in governance and
regulation. 12  Certification of farming practices is connected to related developments in other sectors, including organic
labeling, 13  fishery sustainability, 14  fair trade in coffee, 15  and others, although it appears to be more comprehensive
and influential.
This article treats certification of farming practices both as an indicator of broader trends in the administrative law of
global governance, and as a place from which to trace connections to other regulatory domains. 16  Because certification is
now embedded within formal legal and regulatory structures in the European Union, the *265  United States, and several
Asian jurisdictions, understanding how it has operated within the private-standard regulatory sphere will undoubtedly
inform how certification may work as it adopts more public-sector attributes and in more countries. 17  For example, the
2011 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) in the United States adopted as part of its official regulatory apparatus a
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program for accreditation of third-party auditors, also known as certification bodies, to conduct food safety audits and
issue certifications of foreign facilities and the foods for humans and animals they produce. 18
The objective of this article is to examine not only the durability and strength of private sector standard setting in the food
safety system, but also the desirability of that system as an alternative (or perhaps complement) to formal, governmental
processes embodied in the standards adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and implemented by national
governments. In many cases, Codex standards and GlobalG.A.P. standards clash in ways that implicate not only food
safety, but the free flow of agricultural products in the global trading system. Private standards were first brought to the
World Trade Organization's (WTO) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards in 2005 by St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, which complained that the rules and standards of GlobalG.A.P. were more stringent than international
standards and government requirements, and argued that public rules should apply. 19  By raising its concern about
GlobalG.A.P. and other private entities in general at the WTO, St. Vincent and the Grenadines triggered heated debates
at the international level with countries divided on the issue. 20  The position of St. Vincent and the Grenadines was
supported by Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina. The issue of private standards has since then been raised frequently
as a specific trade concern at the WTO. 21
The threshold inquiries that all stakeholders must make is: do the individual and public health benefits, if any, provided
by private food safety standards, justify their costs? Do the processes leading to standard development--public and
private--adequately protect the participation of stakeholders, hold decision-makers accountable, and operate with the
transparency necessary for that accountability to occur? 22  While Codex processes have often been accused of being
politicized on important food safety matters, 23  the replacement of Codex standards in specific instances by GlobalG.A.P.
standards poses challenges to the availability of less expensive food that is nevertheless just as safe. Moreover, the
predominance of private standards over public ones necessarily implicates the market shaping influence of those standards:
through the standards, a relatively small number of global food *266  retailers exercise disproportionate influence on the
export potential of low- and middle-income countries. 24
Our methodology in answering this inquiry is to select two product specific sectors--fish and crops--and two process
specific approaches-- certification bodies and traceability--and identify applicable Codex and GlobalG.A.P. standards.
After analyzing textual and process differences in the standards, we identify three jurisdictions where both standards
apply-- Honduras, Thailand, and the United States--and evaluate the relative influence of Codex and GlobalG.A.P.
standards on farming practices. In future work, we intend to expand this comparison to a broader set of jurisdictions.
At the outset, we acknowledge certain limitations inherent in our approach. First, Codex has a much longer history than
GlobalG.A.P., and therefore a larger number of standards that apply to any given product or process. We have analyzed
all Codex standards but concede that there may be relevant information contained in an ostensibly inapplicable standard.
A standard applicable to live and raw bivalve molluscs, for example, may have a labeling provision covering a wider
category of food than its title suggests. Second, Codex and GlobalG.A.P. share food safety mandates but have broader
missions that make perfect comparison difficult or impossible. Codex has an explicit mandate to “ensur[e] fair practices
in the food trade” while GlobalG.A.P. nominally monitors conduct that affects the welfare of animals and the rights of
workers. 25  Nevertheless, the broader scholarly consensus holds that both organizations largely orient their activities
toward the food safety objective. 26
The next two subsections describe the historical emergence of the global food regulatory system and the primary actors:
Codex and GlobalG.A.P. Section III describes their rule-making and adjudicatory policies and practices. Section IV
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analyzes Codex and GlobalG.A.P. standards in two product and two process sectors and explores what the effect of
those standards are in jurisdictions where at least some producers comply with both. Section V offers some preliminary
assessments of the effectiveness, reliability and accountability of the emerging global regulatory system. It suggests that
private certification of farming practices has triggered significant changes in the global food safety regulatory environment
that are likely to expand; that private standards, like public ones, may ultimately be driven by market shaping as *267
much as food safety objectives, and that accountability mechanisms for both are in need of substantial development in
the case of GlobalG.A.P. and reform in the case of Codex.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Codex
The need for an international system to regulate food safety was acknowledged soon after the end of the Second World
War when national food safety regulations as well as the industrialization of food production posed new and transnational
problems in assuring both the availability and safety of food. The history of Codex dates back to the creation of the FAO
and WHO in the late 1940s, both of which had mandates to address, at least in part, the aforementioned problems. 27  In
1950, the FAO and WHO formed the First Joint Expert Committee on Nutrition (Joint Expert Committee), emphasizing
the need to address the inconsistencies of international food standards. 28  In 1955, the Fourth Joint Expert Committee
declared the uncontrolled use of food additives a pressing matter of public concern and established a committee to draft
guidelines on food additive control and use. 29
The Joint Expert Committee joined a number of international and regional food regulatory agencies that had evolved
in the post-war period. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for example, established a Geneva
Protocol that proposed standards and guidelines for food commodities, mainly fruits and vegetables. 30  The FAO/
WHO Committee of Governmental Experts worked with the International Dairy Federation to implement milk quality
and labeling requirements. 31  Europe had worked out a region-wide harmonization system, the Codex Alimentarius
Europaeus, based on a model developed under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. 32
In 1960, the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus partnered with WHO and FAO as part of an effort to create a global set of
food safety, testing, labeling and nutrition standards. 33  During the 1961 FAO/WHO Eleventh Joint Expert Committee,
the FAO passed the resolution, which led to the establishment of the Codex Alimentarius Commission as it is known
today. 34
*268  The First Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission was held in Rome in October 1963, and was attended
by an estimated 120 participants from 30 countries. 35  To date, 188 members (187 member countries and one member
organization) are represented in the Codex. 36  Codex is assisted in its work both by independent international experts
and other international organizations to develop a scientific basis for its standards. 37
Codex offers three avenues of organizational participation based on a party's qualifications. 38  First, membership is
open to all countries but is contingent upon membership in both the WHO and FAO. 39  Only member countries and
member organizations (Members) approve standards and guidelines, sit on committees within the organization, and
submit candidates for executive positions. Second, countries and organizations that either do not qualify for membership
or choose not to become Members can still participate in Codex as observing parties (Observers). 40  While Observers are
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
ASSESSING THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE AND EFFICACY..., 72 Food & Drug L.J. 262
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
technically not entitled to give input at sessions, Observers customarily have been permitted to express their opinions on
particular issues and policies. 41  Third, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) also may attain Observer status. 42  IGOs are required to submit an application for review by the Codex
Secretariat and the legal offices of both the WHO and FAO, where additional inquiries may be required. 43  The
application process for unaffiliated NGOs is similar; however, NGO applications require more detailed information. 44
Codex has adopted over 300 codes of practices, guidelines, and standards regulating nearly all aspects of food moving
in international commerce from nutrition labeling to food additives, to infant formula, to principles for food import
and export certification. Technically, Codex standards are neither binding nor self-executing even among its member
countries. 45  Each government is free to develop its own food health and safety standards framework. 46  However,
Codex's relevance increased substantially after *269  1995 when the WTO was established. At that point, Codex
standards became the international benchmark for trade compliant food hygiene regulations.
Codex is now the official standard reference body for the WTO when food safety or labeling measures are challenged as
burdening free trade, according to its Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. 47  It plays a similar, although not
dominant, role for the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. All countries who agreed to the creation of the
WTO in 1994 may be bound by WTO panel decisions regarding SPS and TBT issues; 48  therefore, these countries may
be constrained by Codex standards. 49  If a Member country wishes to impose SPS-related standards more stringent than
Codex's standards, the country must provide an adequate scientific basis for taking such actions. 50  Codex standards,
while criticized on several levels, have been credited with raising the global standard of food safety.
B. GlobalG.A.P.
The movement for private certification of farming practices resulted from two consumer-related pressures and at least
as many formal, regulatory ones. The first was from the frequent incidence of food quality and safety episodes in the
1990s and 2000s and, implicitly, the seeming failure of the international food safety and quality assurance system to
safeguard against threats arising from the food supply chain. 51  The second was from growing consumer pressures for
aspects of the food system like animal welfare and workers' rights to be respected. 52  Although the causes of food safety
and quality failures are multiple and vary from case to case, an important cause in many cases is quality control failure
at the point of production.
*270  Governments responded by adopting measures aimed at reducing contamination and breaches in the food supply
chain. The UK, for example, passed the Food Safety Act in 1990, which increased liabilities on retailers. 53  Coincident
with pressures arising from the integrity of the food supply chain, the growing integration of the European economy
highlighted the barriers that disparate private and public food safety standards were erecting across the producer-retailer
food sectors. 54
GlobalG.A.P. began in 1997 as EurepGAP, an initiative by retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce Working
Group. British retailers worked together with supermarkets in continental Europe to address what they argued to be
consumer demand regarding product safety, environmental impact and the health, safety, and welfare of workers and
animals. 55  The standards helped producers comply with Europe-wide accepted criteria for food safety, sustainable
production methods, worker and animal welfare, and responsible use of water, compound feed and plant propagation
materials. 56
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Over the next ten years the process spread throughout Europe and beyond. Driven by more episodes involving
compromised food safety systems, more producers and retailers subscribed to GlobalG.A.P. audits, approval, and
certification. EurepGAP changed its name to GlobalG.A.P. in 2007. Today, GlobalG.A.P. is the most influential private
standard setting body in the world, certifying more than 134,000 farms in at least 116 countries. 57
II. STRUCTURES AND STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES OF CODEX AND GLOBAL G.A.P.
A. Codex Structure and Standard Setting Process
Led by the geographically balanced Executive Committee, Codex consists of twenty-four active committees and task
forces. 58  The Executive Committee manages the development of committee standards and guidelines, and develops
strategic plans for implementation. 59  Typically, the Executive Committee combines such submissions with those of
lower level subcommittees for Commission consensus or *271  vote. 60  The Executive Committee may exercise the
Commission's powers to appoint subcommittee officials or implement Commission approved standards. 61  Commission
votes are with some frequency conducted by secret ballot, and while Codex custom, like that of other international
organizations, stresses consensus and transparency, 62  it has adopted several standards through secret ballot applying
majority vote (sometimes narrowly so) for such decisions. 63
Beneath the Codex's executive and administrative organs sit four subsidiary bodies responsible for developing the
standards to be reviewed by the Commission and Executive Committee. 64  These subsidiary bodies create subcommittees
to develop standards for specific regions, subjects and commodities. 65  A host country heads each subcommittee, which
is responsible for subcommittee maintenance and administrative functions. 66
The mandate of the Codex is to develop international food standards, guidelines, and recommendations to “protect the
health of consumers” as well as “ensure fair practices in food trade.” 67  The Codex standard-setting process, framed
by the “Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts,” 68  resembles a structured domestic
rulemaking process that may be found in a democratic regulatory state. The same procedures apply to the elaboration
of Codex guidelines, codes of practices, and other texts. The eight steps detailed below show important elements of the
Codex standard-setting process.
First, a Codex committee or member can propose new work or revision of an international standard. 69  The proposal,
together with a project document 70  prepared by the committee or member, is evaluated by the Executive Committee 71
through a critical review process taking into account the relevant expert scientific advice available from the FAO or
WHO, special needs of developing countries, and criteria and priorities established by the Codex Commission. 72
*272  After the critical review, the Codex Commission decides to elaborate a new standard and designate a responsible
subsidiary body for the preparatory work. Second, after the Codex Commission evaluates the official standard proposal,
it undergoes a drafting process, in which members, FAO and WHO expert bodies, and Codex committees participate
to create the draft text. On the basis of available scientific evidence, dedicated scientific committees 73  conduct risk
assessments and make recommendations for the use of food additives, or maximum limits for residues of pesticides or
animal drugs, and so on. 74  Third, the Secretariat circulates the draft text (prepared in step 2) to members and other
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interested parties (international organizations, NGOs, and industry representatives) for comment with regard to all
aspects of the proposed draft standard--from scientific evidence to economic interests. 75  Fourth, the Secretariat returns
both the draft and comments to the relevant subsidiary body (committee), which considers and, if necessary, amends the
draft text. The draft and the comments are reviewed at the committee level. 76  In steps 5 through 7, with the endorsement
of the relevant Codex committee in step 4, the Executive Committee again conducts a critical review. 77  The Secretariat
then submits the proposed draft, the Executive Committee's critical review and members' comments to the Commission
for its adoption of the draft as an official “draft standard.” 78  Based upon a two-thirds majority of votes and the Executive
Committee's critical review, the Commission may decide that the draft standards are ready for both an accelerated
procedure and the final adoption, which takes place during the eighth step. 79
The Secretariat again sends the official draft standard to members and other interested parties for a final round of review
and comments. The Secretariat returns the comments to the relevant committee for consideration and, if necessary,
amendment. Finally, the Executive Committee, for the third and last time, conducts a critical review of the draft standard
in its finalized form together with the comments submitted by members or interested parties. The Commission then
decides to adopt, discard, or suspend the draft standard. If adopted, the draft standard becomes a formal Codex standard
and is published by the Secretariat.
B. The GlobalG.A.P. Structure and Standard-Setting Process
GlobalG.A.P. is a private standard-setting body that “regulates” its member suppliers with various sets of standards,
corporate social responsibility recommendations, best practices, codes of conduct, and extensive checklists that *273
incorporate those standards into evaluation criteria. 80  GlobalG.A.P. sets out pre-farm-gate, business-to-business
standards (i.e. there is no scheme to inform consumers through labeling or advertising about GlobalG.A.P. certified
foods), covering activities from seedlings, feed, pesticide use, and harvesting etc. until the food product leaves
the farm gate. Standard compliance is monitored through third party certification that producers are following
General Regulations, Control Points and Compliance Criteria (CPCC) Protocol, checklists, and guidelines of general
interpretation and application. 81  Agni Kalfagianni and Doris Fuchs succinctly explain the GlobalG.A.P. approach:
The general regulations set out the rules by which the standard is administered ... describe[] the basic steps
and considerations involved for the applicant to obtain and maintain GlobalG.A.P. certification, as well
as the role of producers, GlobalG.A.P. and certification bodies .... The CPCC Protocol is the standard
with which farmers must comply and which are audited to verify compliance ... listing for each scope
and sub-scope the control points, compliance criteria and the level of compliance required. Checklists are
used by farmers to fulfil[l] the annual internal audit requirement and also form the basis of the farmers'
external audit. They replicate the Control Points in the CPCC, and are therefore also composed of modular
sections. 82
The organization is administered by a Board above all the other organs including the Secretariat (legally represented
by FoodPLUS GmbH, a privately held limited liability entity incorporated under German law) which is in charge of
executive management for policy and standard implementation, Certification Body Committee, Technical Committees,
Focus Groups, Integrity Surveillance Committee, and National Technical Working Groups. 83  The Board consists of
an equal number of elected producers (50%) and retailers (50%) and is headed by an independent chairman. 84  The
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Board adopts decisions according to a structured consultation process. 85  GlobalG.A.P. standards are developed and
implemented by a few Technical Committees, Focus Groups, and Certification Body Committee. 86  There are three
categories of members under the GlobalG.A.P. governance structure: retailers and food services providers, producers,
and associate members. However, GlobalG.A.P. membership varies year by year as members are free to join and *274
drop out anytime. 87  GlobalG.A.P. has a global membership in terms of geographic coverage, yet its European members
dominate the organization--European firms account for 93% of all retailers, and producers in Europe amount to 72%
of all suppliers. 88
The GlobalG.A.P. standard-setting process is composed of six essential steps. 89  First, a standard-setting procedure may
be initiated upon a member (retailer or producer) request, followed by a stakeholder analysis to determine if such a
proposed standard will be viable in the GlobalG.A.P. context; namely, whether the proposed product/process standard
falls in the scope of GlobalG.A.P. and who the potential clients might be. 90  Second, the GlobalG.A.P. Secretariat defines
target markets and evaluates the proposed standard in terms of its value and necessity against the existing standard. 91
Third, when the evaluation process (similar to cost benefit analysis) is completed, a standard proposal will be submitted
to the Board to approve and reject by consensus, and the Board decision will be published online. 92  If the Board decides
in favor of proceeding with standard setting procedure, the terms of reference will also be published for the public (in
particular interested parties) to review and comment. A relevant Sector Committee (Sector Committee members are
elected for a three-year term by their supplier and retailer peers) oversees developing the standard.
GlobalG.A.P. procedures require two rounds of public comment periods, each of which must remain open for 60 days.
If the proposal concerns a new standard, the second round is accompanied by at least two trial on-site audits. Fourth,
GlobalG.A.P. incorporates the comments received during the public comment procedures, responds to individual
comments, and prepares a summary of the standards online. 93  Decisions on whether to incorporate certain comments
at the Sector Committee level are generally adopted by consensus, or, in the alternative, a simple majority vote (with
minority views documented). 94  Fifth, after the proposal is approved by the relevant Sector Committee and adopted
by the Board, an interim final standard is published online. 95  While the interim final standard enters into force upon
publication, it will not become a final standard until a last round of comment (on technical errors only) for four weeks.
Finally, after the standard is finalized, the GlobalG.A.P. Secretariat translates all relevant documents according to
member *275  demand. 96  The Board and Sector Committees also review and revise the standard every four years, taking
into account technological and market developments, to ensure the standard's relevance and effectiveness.
III. THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE AND EFFICACY OF CODEX AND GLOBALG.A.P. STANDARDS
Theoretically, there is no reason that public and private standards may not harmoniously coexist. As long as GlobalG.A.P.
standards do not explicitly or implicitly encourage violation of relevant law, they may be seen as merely complementing
existing law or providing a set of market entry requirements for certain producers who wish to enjoy some benefit by
forming and sustaining a relationship with one or more major retailers. 97  For example, GlobalG.A.P. requirements are
quite extensive in terms of generating and retaining documentary support for their compliance criteria--a characteristic
that would, if anything, assist in complying with statutory and regulatory frameworks that may share compliance criteria,
but be less demanding with respect to record generation and retention. Some countries, like Turkey, for example, have
explicitly adopted GlobalG.A.P. standards as their national regulatory scheme. 98
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
ASSESSING THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE AND EFFICACY..., 72 Food & Drug L.J. 262
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9
Practically, compliance with GlobalG.A.P. standards has become an independent legal regime whereby the third-party
accreditation scheme shifts risk away from larger retailers and upon farmers and producers, and consequently, creates
barriers to entry for smaller or poorer producers. 99  Moreover, there has been little study into the relationship between
compliance with GlobalG.A.P. standards and food safety benefits. Indeed, both independent research and GlobalG.A.P.
memoranda concede that their standards have not resulted in uniform outcomes or even responses. 100  There are
therefore relevant questions to answer as GlobalG.A.P. continues to overshadow formal regulation in the food safety
sector, especially whether the costs it imposes are with the benefits it generates. The following discussion analyzes Codex
and GlobalG.A.P. standards, and compliance criteria in two product sectors (aquaculture and fresh fruit and vegetables)
and two process standards (certification by third-party auditors and chain-of-custody requirements) to highlight what
gaps, if any, separate Codex from GlobalG.A.P. and, using examples from countries in which both standards apply,
assess GlobalG.A.P.'s influence, costs, and benefits.
*276  A. Product Standards
1. Aquaculture and Fisheries
Fish continues to be one of the most-traded food commodities worldwide. 101  According to the FAO, 45% of the world
fish catch is now traded internationally. 102  The fishery trade is especially important for developing nations, in some
cases accounting for more than half of the total value of traded commodities. 103  According to the National Marine
Fisheries Service, 86 percent of the seafood the U.S. consumes is imported. 104  Seafood consumption has increased in the
United States in recent decades, reaching a high during the past decade: the average American now eats approximately
16.5 pounds of seafood each year, compared with 10 to 12 pounds during the 1980s. 105  This increase is reflected globally
as the contribution of fish to global diets has reached a record of about 17 kg (37.4 lbs) per person on average, supplying
over three billion people with at least 15 percent of their average animal protein intake. 106
The extensive production and transportation networks involved with the fish and seafood trade open vulnerabilities to
contamination and spoilage. 107  Chemicals, metals, marine toxins, and infectious agents have been found in seafood.
Infectious agents associated with food-borne illness include bacteria, viruses, and parasites, and the illnesses caused
by these agents range from mild gastroenteritis to life-threatening syndromes. Seafood is responsible for an important
proportion of food-borne illness and outbreaks both in the United States and worldwide. 108  While not every country
tracks seafood-related illnesses and infections, reports from the FAO suggest that seafood borne illnesses may comprise
up to 16.1% of all foodborne related illnesses in some countries. 109
Codex and GlobalG.A.P. each have issued detailed standards and codes of conduct for assuring the safety of seafood,
or at least minimizing the risks of contamination or decomposition. Codex recommends the application of Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point approach designed for all food safety (CODEX/RCP 1-1969) with far more detailed
standards and recommendations both for fishery products specifically (fish, crustaceans and molluscan shellfish, etc.) as
well as additional processes applicable to the handling of fish and shellfish (e.g. cleaning and disinfection of fish *277
processing facilities, controlling sources of contamination, providing adequate lighting). Similarly, GlobalG.A.P. builds
its general regulations for aquaculture over its integrated farm assurance requirements applicable to all the producers who
participate in its certification system. 110  GlobalG.A.P. certification is more demanding with respect to documentation
for specific practices. For example, where Codex recommends that “no fish, shellfish and other aquatic invertebrates
should be accepted if they are known to contain parasites, undesirable micro-organisms, pesticides, veterinary drugs or
toxic, decomposed or extraneous substances known to be harmful to human health,” GlobalG.A.P. certification requires
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that “[f]ish ... introduced to the farm shall be certified free from known diseases” and that records be kept on “information
on sampling protocols, test methods and reagents, frequency and results” of disease surveillance all documents of which
must be further certified by a “competent authority.” 111
Yet there has been little examination into whether the relatively more burdensome documentation provisions of
GlobalG.A.P. compliance correspond to better food safety outcomes. This is important given the cost that participation
in GlobalG.A.P. imposes. Thailand, for example, has adopted Codex standards with respect to a national good
agricultural practices program aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of its shrimp industry, which generates $2.1 billion
in annual revenues and employs nearly 1 million people. 112  Thai standards cover all stages of production, processing
and marketing, and subjects farms to inspection and documentation. 113  By May 2008, nearly half of Thailand's 363,946
registered farms--including aquaculture--were certified for national quality control standards. 114  The Thai Department
of Fishery (DOF) establishes guidelines for all stages: hatchers to farm rearing to processing and shipment all the way to
the consumers. Thai DOF auditors assess all processes of shrimp farming against the code of conduct for Responsible
Fishery, with guidelines on aquaculture from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the ISO14001 standard
for Environmental Management System (EMS).
Shrimp transporters and processors must comply with international health and safety standards and must provide
traceability of products. DOF also certifies marine shrimp feed and issues licenses to certified producers and importers
of aquatic feed. Random checking is carried out to ensure feed quality, and antibiotic inspection is employed to detect
the presence of prohibited antibiotics. 115
*278  Yet in 2008, only 923 of Thai registered farms qualified for GlobalG.A.P. certification, and that number has
subsequently declined to 277. 116  A study conducted by the Fisheries & Environmental Science of Kasetsart University
evaluated the impact on Thai farms if GlobalG.A.P. rather than Codex standards applied. Eighteen shrimp farms were
sampled from different farm types (seven small single farms; six medium single farms; and five small/medium, group
farms, covering both inland and coastal farms) in the Central, East and South of Thailand. The sample represented more
or less typical shrimp farming practices in the country. 117  The studied farms were audited clause-by-clause against the
GlobalG.A.P. criteria. The sampled farms complied with nearly half of the GlobalG.A.P. criteria with no significant
difference among different farm sizes. In general, the compliance level of the farms with aquaculture standards was
highest (47-52%), followed by shrimp specific standards (44-46 percent), workers' rights (43-45%) and the more general
standards GlobalG.A.P. applies to all farms (22-27%). 118  For aquaculture, the compliance failures largely had to do
with procedures to deal with customer complaints and product recall rather than ex ante food safety practices. 119
Even within GlobalG.A.P. standards, it is not necessarily clear that they are more demanding or consistent in
their approach to food safety principles. GlobalG.A.P. standards are divided into “major musts,” “minor musts,”
and recommendations. 120  Certified farms must pass 100%) of all “major musts,” 95% of all “minor musts,” while
recommendations do not affect certification but may become “minor musts” over time. 121  Under GlobalG.A.P.
standards, monitoring fish for health indicators is a “minor must” while having a system to register all disease occurrences
is a “major must,” but does not require any documentation as to the existence of the system. 122  Producers are required
to maintain a written “equipment cleaning and disinfection plan,” but a food safety system in place at the time of an
auditor's inspection is a recommendation. 123  As Antoine Bernard de Raymond and Laure Bonnaud have observed,
“there exists not one but several interpretations of GlobalG.A.P.” 124
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2. Fresh Fruits and Vegetables
International trade of fresh fruit and vegetables is a billion-dollar business that has significantly increased in the last
decade. 125  Between 2003 and 2007 alone, the value *279  of fruit and vegetable imports increased by 60%. 126  Among
GlobalG.A.P.'s supplier members, 70% are in the area of crops (while 22% are in aquaculture). 127
Increasing trade in fruits and vegetables has been accompanied by increases in the number of reported outbreaks
of foodborne illness linked to fresh produce of both imported and domestic origins. 128  Fresh produce is especially
vulnerable to microbiological contamination and may also become contaminated post-harvest, especially during the
stages of processing, transportation, preparation, or storage. Contaminated fruits and vegetables not only harm human
health and life, but also undermine the public's confidence in the safety of the food supply. 129  In addition, as more
people consume raw and/or fresh-cut produce without cooking or treatments to reduce or control pathogens, fresh
produce may pose even more health risks. According to the WHO, fresh fruits and vegetables pose particular risks for
hepatitis A, ascaris, Cryptosporidium, entamoeba histolytica, giardia, salmonella, Campylobacter, enterohaemorrhagic
escherichia coli, listeria, and vibrio cholera as well as chemical toxins. 130  Indeed, there have been several of these kinds
of outbreaks of foodborne pathogens in the U.S., such as the fresh spinach outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 in 2006, 131  the
peanut butter outbreak of Salmonella typhimurium in 2008, 132  and cantaloupe outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes in
2011. 133  Between 1996 and 2010, about 131 reported produce-related outbreaks occurred, resulting in 14,350 illnesses,
1,382 hospitalizations, and 34 deaths. 134  Contamination is likely to occur at an early stage along the production chain,
such as during growing and harvesting. 135
Codex standards for fresh fruits and vegetables are codified in the Code of Hygienic Practice for Fresh Fruits and
Vegetables (Codex Fresh Produce Code) as well as many produce- and process-specific standards like dates, corn, fruit
cocktails mixtures, and *280  table olives. 136  The Codex Fresh Produce Code was adopted in 2003 and amended
in 2010 with Annex III for Fresh Leafy Vegetables, 2012 with Annex IV for Melons, and in 2013 with Annex V for
Berries. 137  The main section of the Codex Fresh Produce Code is composed of ten parts--objectives of the code;
scope; use and definitions; primary production; packing establishment: design and facilities; control of operation;
packing establishment: maintenance and sanitation; packing establishment: personal hygiene; transportation; product
information and consumer awareness; and training. 138  The GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard: Control Points
and Compliance Criteria (GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard) is the Codex Fresh Produce Code's counterpart
instrument. 139  The current edition of the GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard was adopted on July 24, 2013,
and became obligatory from October 24, 2013. The Standard covers only part of the GlobalG.A.P. Integrated Farm
Assurance Standard that is directly related to food safety--including Section AF: all farm base module, Section CB Crops
Base Module, and Section FV: Fruit and Vegetables Module. 140
Both the Codex Fresh Produce Code and the GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard address GAPs and Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), which aim to address microbial, chemical, and physical hazards associated with all
stages of the production--from primary production to packing--of fruits and vegetables. Nevertheless, contrary to the
general applicability of the GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard, the Codex Fresh Produce Code pays particular
attention to reducing microbial hazards in specific product categories. 141  In terms of regulatory rigor and flexibility,
Codex provides a general framework of recommendations for governments to move toward international harmonization,
especially in the specified sectors. Codex does not provide detailed recommendations for specific agricultural practices
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but maintains a necessary level of flexibility. The GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard, on the other hand, lays out
an extensive 81-page document, detailing not only standards for fruits and vegetables at all production stages, but also
the designs and practices of farms and crops bases.
The Codex Fresh Produce Code is based on the format of the General Principles of Food Hygiene with regard to
formats and basic principles, 142  but provides further rules on hygienic issues specific to fruits and vegetables. For
example, the Annex for Sprout Production sets out supplementary recommendations for sprout seeds and the primary
*281  production of sprouts for human consumption; 143  the Annex for Fresh Leafy Vegetables gives additional
guidance for the farming, harvesting, packing, processing, storage, distribution, marketing, and consumption of raw
leafy vegetables; 144  and the Annex for Melons provides specific advice on how to minimize microbiological hazards in
the process of farming, packing, and transporting fresh melons. 145  The Codex Fresh Produce Code covers guidance
on environmental hygiene, water for irrigation and harvesting, manure, biosolids and other natural fertilizers, soil,
and biological control. 146  The Fresh Produce Code, its Annexes, and the General Principles of Food Hygiene should
therefore be read together in application. 147
The GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard goes beyond mere safety and hygienic practices for the primary production
of fruits and vegetables, covering additional issues such as food defense, 148  worker safety and welfare, 149  infrastructure
and training for employees, 150  application of organic fertilizer, 151  and site management. 152  With regard to the
standard on control points and compliance criteria for fruits and vegetables, the GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard
applies the same regulatory system--i.e. categorizing control points and compliance criteria into major must, minor
must, and recommended on the basis of their respective importance as well as premising enforcement measures on
extensive and detailed checklists. 153  In addition, the GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard sets out compliance-
facilitating requirements, such as record keeping and internal self-assessments, and internal inspection against applicable
control points. 154  Most importantly, the GlobalG.A.P. Standard gives step-by-step “decision trees” 155  that are readily
operational.
As with aquaculture, GlobalG.A.P. fresh fruit and vegetable standards play mixed roles in food supply chains. Hortifruti,
Walmart's Central American regional distribution entity, sources its fresh fruits and vegetables from about 284
producers, but only 30 of those have passed GlobalG.A.P. certifications. 156  As with Thai fisheries, most non-compliant
firms actually were compliant with the food safety practices endorsed by Codex like pest- and disease-control practices,
general cleanliness, and contamination control, but tended to fail in areas like postharvest facilities. 157  Indeed, in the
context of Hortifruti's activities in Honduras, Walmart had actually created an *282  adapted form of GlobalG.A.P.
standards in order to balance quality control and supply demands. 158  For example, where GlobalG.A.P. required a
facility with running water for workers to wash their hands in the fields, the standard was adapted to allow a bucket of
water with a spigot and disinfectant soap. 159
B. Process Standards
1. Certifying Bodies
GlobalG.A.P.'s scheme is dependent upon third-party certification or audits that verify compliance with its extensive
checklists. In light of the globalized patterns of food production, distribution, and consumption, there has also been
a growing use of certification bodies by public authorities as an important regulatory intermediary in food safety
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governance. 160  Along the global supply chain, certification bodies apply public and/or private standards, perform on-
site audits, and measure the extent of compliance by upstream suppliers and producers to ensure food safety (or other
desired production process or outcomes).
For example, multinational food companies, supermarket chains, and NGOs-- including inter alia GlobalG.A.P.,
British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Standards, Tesco's Nature's Choice, Walmart, Carrefour, and McDonald's--
are increasingly employing private standards, certification protocols, third-party auditing, and transnational contracting
practices to achieve various regulatory objectives. 161  In addition, under Title III of the 2011 Food Safety Modernization
Act (FSMA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is allowed to require certifications from importers as a condition
for entry, where such certifications may be issued by accredited third-party auditors. 162  FDA has proposed new rules
to implement Title III for accreditation and monitoring of third-party auditors of imported food products. 163
While certification bodies play an important role as regulatory intermediaries in food safety conformity assessments, their
actual effectiveness as well as impact on trade and development are contested. On the one hand, given the trade restrictive
effect of certification requirements, member governments of the WTO are urged to follow *283  relevant international
standard, guidelines, and recommendations 164 --namely, the Codex instruments. Likewise, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) (the adoption of which is now in doubt) SPS Chapter stipulates a legal obligation for member governments
to “take into account relevant guidance of the WTO SPS Committee and international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations” when enforcing their certification requirements, which shall also limit to essential information for
applicable regulatory objectives. 165  On the other hand, private entities involved in food safety auditing and certification
also have a substantial stake in ensuring the effectiveness, accountability, and legitimacy of the certification bodies. 166  In
some cases, certification and control systems performed by private entities could complement government regulation and
enforcement as certification bodies generally enjoy more technical expertise and financial resource. 167  In other cases,
however, certification bodies could fail to provide rigorous and reliable output, guarantee compliance with regulations
and standards, and eventually become part of the regulatory problem. 168
Given the increasing relevance and importance of certification bodies in ensuring food safety, both Codex and
GlobalG.A.P. have adopted rules and/or guidelines for certification systems. There are two Codex documents for
government agencies' reference, the Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 169  (Codex
Principles) as well as Guidelines for the Design, Operation, Assessment and Accreditation of Food Import and Export
Inspection and Certification Systems 170  (Codex Guidelines). The Codex Principles are short, composed of three sections
that set out general and abstract ideas. The focus of the Codex Principles lies in Section 3, covering fitness for purpose, risk
management, non-discrimination, efficiency, harmonization, equivalence, transparency, special and different treatment,
control and inspection procedures, and certification validity. 171  The Codex Guidelines were first adopted in 1997 and
later revised in 2010 to provide a framework for the development of import and export inspection and certification
systems consistent with the Codex *284  Principles. Similarly, GlobalG.A.P. has adopted the Certification Body and
Accreditation Rules, part of the GlobalG.A.P. General Regulations, to discipline its own auditors and certification
bodies. 172  The GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules are a much more detailed instrument in
comparison to those of the Codex, covering certification body approval process, operation requirements, producer
registration and acceptance, assessment process, certification process, transfer between certification bodies, certification
body sanctions, and integrity programs.
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The Codex Guidelines directly incorporate the definitions of audit, certification, and inspection set by the Codex
Principles to guide governments overseeing activities regarding the equivalence recognition of inspection and certification
systems. 173  The GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules serve to regulate its own certification bodies
for auditing, inspection, certification, and licensing activities. In addition to their voluntary nature, the Codex Guidelines
employ general, flexible, and sometimes vague words regarding the regulatory and methodological recommendations for
governments to consider. For example, in the process of determining regulatory equivalence, the Codex Guidelines state
that “governments should recognize that ... control methodologies can be different but achieve equivalent results.” 174
Also, the Codex Guidelines encourage government inspection systems' “frequency and intensity of controls ... should be
designed to take account of risk and the reliability of control already carried out by those handling the products.” 175  In
some cases, the extent of vagueness in the wording of the guidelines may render the documents much less operational--e.g.
“the national competent authority in the exporting or importing country should have the ability to enforce and
take action based on adequate legislation. It should take all necessary steps to ensure the integrity, impartiality and
independence of official inspection systems and officially recognized inspection systems.” 176  Terms such as “should have
the ability,” “adequate legislation,” and “take all necessary steps” are far from readily operational and implementable,
understandably due to the document's legally non-binding and advisory nature.
In contrast with the Codex Guidelines, the GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules are a much
more extensive, rigorous, and detailed set of norms. The GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules
are a much lengthier instrument than the Codex Principles and the Codex Guidelines combined, and include issue
areas that are not covered in the Codex documents-- e.g. training and qualification of personnel 177  and transfer
between certification bodies. 178  In addition, despite their private ordering nature, the GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body
and Accreditation Rules generally use strong language like “shall” so as to impose mandatory responsibility to all
GlobalG.A.P. certification and auditing bodies.
*285  The GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules contain specific requirements that leave little
flexibility. For example, with regard to the final approval of certification bodies, the GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body
and Accreditation Rules ask that such certification bodies “shall obtain ISO/TEC 17065 (an international inspector
qualification standard) accreditation within six months after the date of provisional approval” and that “as a condition
for final approval, the provisionally approved [certification bodies] shall have at least one in house trainer ... who
has completed the required training available for the applied sub-scope.” 179  Furthermore, there are specific criteria
regarding experience and qualification, education and legal/technical knowledge, and declaration of independence and
confidentiality, which are applicable to GlobalG.A.P. auditors and certification bodies. 180  Additional requirements
include that certification holders shall perform internal self-assessments, and that licensed certification bodies conduct
unannounced inspections on certificate holders. 181
GlobalG.A.P. maintains a grading system in terms of compliance and follows the CPCC instrument--major musts,
minor musts, and recommendations are listed in different modules covering various sectors, products, and areas as well
as respective levels of compliance. 182  As opposed to the loosely defined integrity clause in the Codex Guidelines, the
GlobalG.A.P. Certification Body and Accreditation Rules provides a good structure and clearly defined integrity system.
Under the GlobalG.A.P. integrity system, there are two components for different regulatory purposed--Brand Integrity
Program (BIPRO) and Certification Integrity Program (CIPRO). 183  BIPRO deals with non-compliance issues that
have brand/GlobalG.A.P. integrity implications, such as false or incomplete registration, failure to meet requirements,
or fraud. 184  CIPRO deals with non-compliance by certification bodies during the process of certification. 185  More
specifically, the Integrity Team of the GlobalG.A.P. Secretariat is involved in a record inspection in the GlobalG.A.P.
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database based on the classification result of a risk assessment taking into account product characteristics, compliance
history, and complaints, etc. 186  The GlobalG.A.P. Integrity Team may also decide to perform an on-site reassessment
by observing certification bodies audit production processes of certificate holders in order to ensure inspection
effectiveness. 187
*286  Unlike produce-specific standards, there is less evidence that any particular component of third-party certification
requirements translate into substantial differences between compliance and non-compliance. What is logical from
GlobalG.A.P.'s more extensive requirements is that it is more costly to use third-party certifiers who qualify to serve as
GlobalG.A.P. auditors. As Suzuki and others note, GlobalG.A.P. demands for third-party certification bodies are “a
rather high hurdle” even in high-resource, well-regulated economies like Japan. 188  In adopting its final rule for third-
party certification bodies under FSMA, FDA acknowledged the wide range of evidence that could be used to establish
auditor competency, requiring flexibly articulated criteria (embodied in international standards) that could be met by
both governmental agencies and private firms: ensure audit agents are competent and objective, verify the effectiveness
of corrective actions to address identified deficiencies in audited facilities, assess and correct any problems in their own
performance, and maintain and provide FDA access to records required to be kept under the program.” 189
2. Traceability
Given the growing reach and scope of global food supply chains, traceability of food sources has become increasingly
important. A can of tuna, for example, may originate with tuna caught off Australia, go through pre-canning processes in
Thailand, be canned in Spain, and finally reach a distributor in Michigan before an American consumer ultimately buys
it. 190  When food safety problems occur, firms need to be able to quickly identify the product, which lots are involved,
where they were shipped and where they are presently.
GlobalG.A.P. embeds its traceability standards both through its product specific modules and through chain-of-
custody requirements. Sourcing, identification, and traceability for livestock, for example, include animal identification,
records, and segregation of certified and non-certified animals (although these requirements do not appear to contain
the same robust record-keeping that other provisions do). For aquaculture, labeling and traceability requirements
include traceability forward, backwards and identification of farms by geographical coordinates. GlobalG.A.P. recently
introduced two control points on registered varieties and compliance with IP rights on varieties, thus taking a step toward
using its traceability certifications for enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as food safety and other concerns
relevant to traceability systems. 191
Strictly speaking, GlobalG.A.P. standards for chain-of-custody certifications do not serve a food safety purpose.
According to GlobalG.A.P., chain of custody certifications ensure “segregation and traceability throughout the supply
chain.” 192  As *287  a practical matter, there would be little reason for GlobalG.A.P. chain of custody standards to
matter unless they secured underlying food safety (and sustainability and social welfare) guarantees.
Codex principles are more explicit, noting that traceability is a “tool that may be applied, when and as appropriate,
within a food inspection and certification system in order to contribute to the protection of consumers against food-
borne hazards and deceptive marketing practices ...” 193  Yet Codex principles are just that--general guidelines which
have tolerated a wide range of implementation regimes often not closely tied with Codex rationales. Codex, for example,
suggests a strong relationship between traceability systems national governments adopt and the ultimate effect on trade:
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An importing country should consider that a food inspection and certification system without a traceability/
product tracing tool may meet the same objective and produce the same outcomes (e.g. regarding food
safety, provide the same level of protection) as a food inspection and certification system with traceability/
product tracing. 194
Countries implementing traceability systems have tended to disregard the trade aspects of Codex principles. The 2001
Bioterrorism Act in the United States, for example, required food processors to be able to identify the origin of all food
received by lot, code or other identifier and provide the same information when releasing products. 195  The Act applies
to both foreign and domestic food, including all ingredients. FSMA authorizes FDA to order mandatory recalls and
establish a food product tracing system. The Act requires FDA to use pilot studies and stakeholder recommendations
to develop the food product tracing system. 196
There are thus competing influences on traceability regimes under Codex and GlobalG.A.P. that distort their ultimate
orientation toward food safety and consumer protection. As with the regime for products and certifying bodies, the
record-keeping requirements (which impose a substantial component of GlobalG.A.P. compliance costs) may not
ultimately serve the food safety end. An Institute of Food Technologists' study found that in the context of traceability
systems, documentation-intensive systems (as opposed to those that categorize on the basis of risk level) may cause
confusion and delay if there is not a precise framework for defining data inputs; if products carry inconsistent item
descriptions or information is incomplete; and, if the entire corporate chain and ownership structure of sources is not
identified. 197
*288  IV. BALANCING FOOD SAFETY AND MARKET SHAPING OBJECTIVES OF PUBLIC LAW AND
PRIVATE STANDARDS THROUGH LAW
The preceding discussion illustrated some of the strengths and weaknesses of public versus private standards examined
solely through their effect on food safety. The reality is that there are market-shaping objectives behind both publicly
adopted and privately driven standards, and legal accommodation of competing standards requires acknowledgment of
market size and access. The following section describes how these legal accommodations are unfolding, as well as some
advantages and disadvantages of each.
A. Codex Market Politics
Criticism aimed at Codex activities after 1994 has frequently, if not uniformly referred to the special role afforded it
under the WTO's free trade regime. 198  Codex standards have a decisive impact on the market access of agricultural,
animal, and other food products. Given Codex standards' normative implications in the WTO, Codex members have
tended to evaluate proposed standards for their potential impact on trade interests and act strategically. In some cases,
trade considerations may outweigh public health and countries may have material incentives to vote in Codex standard-
setting processes to “advance their trade interests rather than promote food safety.” 199  The relationship between the
SPS Agreement and the Codex encourages countries to push for Codex standards through the use of majority voting
rather than consensus, or even to distort the decision-making process. Emily Lee has argued that the “linkage between
Codex standards and the WTO has diverted the focus of the Commission from health to trade considerations.” 200
Elizabeth Smythe has suggested that “[a]s a result of its changing role, Codex rule-making processes have become more
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politicized ... reflected in the increased involvement of national trade officials pursuing their interests, and the increased
attention and involvement of other organizations.” 201  Consumer advocacy groups take the criticism further. 202
But from Codex's origin--when a number of regional standard-setting organizations threatened to disrupt global trade in
food--to the present day, the *289  organization's mission has always been trade-oriented. 203  In 1973, L.M. Beacham,
the Assistant to the Director of FDA for International Standards, wrote of Codex's mission that it was to create “a
collection of internationally adopted food standards that harmonize the legal requirements of the participating countries,
thereby facilitating international trade and affording consumers sound, wholesome products, informatively labeled in a
uniform manner.” 204  In their brief history of Codex, Franz Vojir, Erwin Schubl, and Ibrahim Elmadfa wrote that “the
[FAO] and the [WHO] of the [UN] were intent on impeding ... regional activities [in rules for the testing of food samples]
to prevent trade barriers at a global level.” 205
Codex has done little to diminish the appearance of imbalance toward trade or industry influence. Codex's structure has
always leaned in favor of not only trade promotion, but giving countries with substantial interests in a given food or
subject area privileged status within the standard-setting process. Norway, for example, has always led standard-setting
for fish and fishery products; China leads the food additives and pesticide residues committees; and Switzerland led the
now-adjourned committees on natural mineral waters and cocoa/chocolate products. 206  In each of these cases, the host
country is either a leading exporter of the regulated commodity or chemical or home to major global firms. The Codex
standard-setting process may appear accountable to Codex members, given the Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex
Standards and Related Texts in theory allows members' comments to be elaborated and considered in the Committees.
However, as there exist no clear rules on determining if there is “consensus” among the members to move onto the
next step, the chairmen of Codex Committees are effectively able to wield considerable power over the standard-setting
process during steps 3 to 7. Such potential problem can be exacerbated in cases involving controversial substances when
the science or non- science concerns are contentious. In effect, whether or not Codex members raise concerns during
steps 3 to 7 might eventually matter little, and the 8-step structured process becomes ossified. 207
Moreover, there are few structural incentives for Codex to reform. The principal agricultural players dominate Codex
committees and external forces, primarily the WTO, remain content to defer to Codex processes. Specifically, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has expressed that the WTO has no responsibility or interest whatsoever to look at
considering the Codex rulemaking practices and determining whether it suffers from procedural defects or legitimacy
deficits. 208
*290  B. GlobalG.A.P. Market Politics
Despite the structural balance GlobalG.A.P. incorporates into its decision-making structure (50% retailers, 50%
producers), it is an organization established for, and driven by, retailers. 209  As Kalfagianni and Fuchs conclude,
“retailers ... still dominate decisions within GlobalG.A.P.” 210  For this reason, technical and administrative complexity
associated with private regulatory schemes, which provide detailed requirements for every stage of the production
and processing chain (“down to the level of each individual producer or processing plant”), 211  drive out small and
often foreign producers with the high costs of compliance. 212  Developing countries often complain that many private
standards seem to exceed relevant government requirements, such as maximal levels of pesticide residues of 50% or even
33% of public standards established by the importing countries, or much more stringent and complicated animal disease
control steps. 213  As a result, since such demanding private food safety standards have emerged from developed countries
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and have considerably affected developing countries' exports, some developing countries have criticized private food
safety standards as new (de facto) SPS market barriers that undermine their trade (export opportunities) and rights to
development. 214
C. Regional Food Safety and Trade Rules
Indeed, GlobalG.A.P. may in many ways represent the re-fragmentation of global food safety rules along regional lines
of the kind Codex was established to prevent. Its retailers and producers are overwhelmingly European. 215  Despite
the participation of North American retailers like Walmart and McDonald's, producers overwhelmingly state that they
undertake GlobalG.A.P. accreditation to access the European, as opposed to North American, market. 216  European
animal welfare and labor laws mean that it is often less costly for European producers to comply with GlobalG.A.P.
requirements.
In some respects, regionalization of food safety rules may effectively maximize public health and economic interests. There
are specific aspects of agricultural products originating in the countries close to Europe like Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, and
Turkey that implicate those specific trade routes, food safety factors, and market *291  access issues. Regional markets
across many sectors may be more economically rational than global ones. On the other hand, the regionalization of
food safety rules has historically been associated with higher priced and less accessible--if not necessarily less safe--food,
so efforts at creating regional alternatives that smooth the disparities caused by privately developed standards may
nevertheless adversely affect overall access to food if regional regimes disrupt global trade in food.
D. Nation-Level Adaptations and Reconciliations between Public and Private Standards
In some countries, both governmental and non-governmental constituencies have created hybrid documents or
arrangements that combine aspects of Codex, GlobalG.A.P., or other standard-setting sources. In Japan, farmers who
sought to reap the perceived benefits of GlobalG.A.P. formed the Japan GAP Association in 2008. Compliance “The ...
goal was to make JGAP internationally recognized standard. This essentially meant that JGAP be benchmarked to
GlobalG.A.P. to facilitate the export of agricultural products to the EU market.” 217  Between 2008 and 2013, although
significantly more farms were certified according to GlobalG.A.P., JGAP reorganized its legal structure and abandoned
GlobalG.A.P. standards for those more tailored to the Japanese legal and market environment and now benchmark
against GFSI, a scheme aligned with Codex's “internationally-recogni[z]ed food safety standards”. 218  Kenya, Chile,
Malaysia, and Mexico 219  have developed government-led Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and certification services
at very low or no cost to assist small suppliers, and they have benchmarked such public certification services against
private standards. Vietnam adopted so-called VietGAP, through ministerial decree, a set of criteria, principles and
procedures regulating growing, harvesting, and post-harvesting. VietGAP was aimed at replacing disparate private
standards like GlobalG.A.P., Marine Stewardship Council, and Aquaculture Stewardship Council with a uniform set of
agricultural practices that more closely mirrored Codex standards. 220  The reasons for steering away from GlobalG.A.P.
are clear-cost. In a survey undertaken by Oleg Nicetic and his research team, they found that there were no producers
in 13 of Vietnam's citrus-growing provinces that complied with GlobalG.A.P. requirements and who could be awarded
certification with minimum adjustments. 221
As with regionalization of food safety standards, the development of formal, national laws that either combine Codex
and GlobalG.A.P. standards, or benchmark against them using third-party certification mechanisms, is justified by
traditional notions of sovereignty and law-making. Since each country has specific factors that *292  affect its approach
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to food safety, each country should tailor its regulations-or tolerance of private standard setting-to those factors. This
was precisely the approach of Codex before it assumed the role it now plays within the WTO system. 222
Yet it was precisely the discordant system of national standards that led both to the creation of Codex post-World War
II and its enshrinement as the official standard for WTO in 1994. States that make GlobalG.A.P. standards part of their
official regulatory approaches more clearly run afoul of the SPS Agreement, since laws and regulations are undoubtedly
“measures” subject to the scientific justifications imposed as part of the SPS Agreement. This issue was raised specifically
by the European Union when the United States passed FSMA; its principal response was based on the trade-burdening
effect the third-party certification scheme may have on European exporters, even though a similar regime operated
without formal sanction in many EU countries. 223
E. Sector-Specific Food Safety Rules
If regional or national approaches to combining Codex and GlobalG.A.P. standards either run afoul of international
trade law or fail tests of economic rationality, a third alternative is for firms to steepen their influence over their
supply chains without coordinating between themselves or for governments to explicitly adopt private standards in
specific sectors. Indonesia, for example, has adopted through regulation sector-by-sector requirements for GlobalG.A.P.
certification like apples and melons, but not other agricultural products. 224
Many countries, including the United States, have developed bilateral, product-specific agreements like those governing
importation of cantaloupes from Mexico, or seafood from Japan. 225  There are also firm-driven quality control
variations that either blend Codex and GlobalG.A.P. standards, or incorporate standards developed elsewhere. Coca-
Cola Japan, for example, requires certification according to FSSC22000, a standard issued by the International Standards
Organization. 226  As the aforementioned example of Walmart's supply chain in Central America shows, some firms have
modified versions of GlobalG.A.P. or Codex standards to fit particular market environments.
This incremental approach has the advantage of tailoring heightened safety standards where it is warranted, without
sweeping up all agricultural practices in a single document or approach.
F. A Global Framework for Food Safety?
One solution to the re-fragmentation of global food safety law is the establishment of a framework convention on food
safety under the auspices of the WHO or the FAO. Such an instrument has been successful in the tobacco control
context at harmonizing varying national and regional approaches and has received implicit acceptance by *293  major
international decision-making bodies as representing “global law” on tobacco control. One of us (Ching-Fu Lin) has
elsewhere proposed such a treaty.
CONCLUSION
The exponential increase in food safety incidents across the globe in the past decades have resulted in mushrooming
regulatory initiatives, including new standards and requirements from national governments, international organizations
(i.e. Codex), and private actors (i.e. GlobalG.A.P.). Such regulatory initiatives, public as well as private, have emerged
primarily to address the rapidly decaying public trust in modern global food chains, complicated by many factors
including the globalization of economic activities, advancements in food science and transportation technology, the
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multi-nationalization of the food industry, and the advent of WTO. Given the significantly transformed production,
transportation, and consumption of food, recent food safety incidents, with their intensified scope, severity, frequency,
and impact, have become global problems requiring global solutions. 227  Despite the unprecedented numbers of food
safety incidents, no multilateral treaty exists to monitor or regulate global food safety, other than the SPS Agreement, 228
which lightly touches upon the side issues of harmonization and scientification from an international-trade-law
(facilitation of food trade) perspective.
In light of the regulatory lacunae in public regulatory space, private actors, such as GlobalG.A.P. (or other multinational
food companies, supermarket chains and non- governmental organizations), are increasingly filling the gaps by
employing private standards, certification protocols, third-party auditing, and transnational contracting practices. 229
The emergence of private governance in the food safety arena has been alongside the gradual decline of states'
traditional command-and-control regulation, which is increasingly being replaced by more flexible, market-oriented
mechanisms. 230  Although private standards such as those *294  of GlobalG.A.P. are, in theory, not mandatory for
suppliers, many have a de facto mandatory status, as a large part of buyers in global agri-food markets now require their
suppliers to meet such private requirements, which are usually stricter than their public counterparts.
This article has analyzed the influence and efficacy of public and private standards, as well as the processes leading to
their development, with the objective of outlining legal regimes that may mandate the use of certain standards when
circumstances warrant; reconcile clashing standards where both apply; and, balance the food safety and market control
objectives embedded in both. In so doing, we have endeavored to place standards' legitimacy (input legitimacy and output
legitimacy)--inclusion of participatory norms, accountability, and transparency-at the center of our inquiry. While the
idea of global food safety governance confers no supremacy to either public or private institutions, their legitimacy derives
from the extent to which their institutional design embeds social (economic, public health, and other) norms in the global
marketplace, norms “that derive authority directly from interested audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not
from sovereign states.” 231
GlobalG.A.P., as well as other private governance models, may suffer from a legitimacy deficit, primarily due to private
regulators' narrow pursuit of corporate profits rather than public goods, 232  and their lack of electoral mandate or
democratic representativeness as enjoyed by public institutions. 233  Such a myriad of legitimacy deficit limits the roles
of private governance and therefore public standards and approaches would seem to remain indispensable. 234  The real
challenge for the next several decades is how to create mechanisms that will seamlessly combine the strengths of market-
driven approaches with the legitimacy that public sector regulation often provides.
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